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MENT, INC., a Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FA I JCON 1\ERO ENTERPRISE, 
l N C., a Utah corporation, and 
CHARLES W. TAGGART, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents~ 
vs. 
JOl-IN F. BOWERS, et al, 
Defendants~ 
INTERMOUNTAIN DEVELOP-





ST.A.TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to real property 
brought by Plaintiffs as the successors in interest to 
Salt Lake County, for which no source of title was 
established, and the Defendant claiming as the fee owner 
of the property. 
3 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a finding for 
the Plaintiffs, this Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the 
decree, and for decree in its own favor as a matter of 
law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant, Intermountain Develop-
ment, Inc., established a chain of title to the property 
concerned in the action back to the patentee (Pretrial 
Exhibit 3) . Plaintiff-Respondent, Falconaero Enter-
prise, Inc., to support its claim, introduced in evidence 
the following documents: Auditor's Deed, dated Feb· 
ruary 28th, 1939, to Salt Lake County (Pre-trial Ex-
hibit 4) ; quit~claim deed from Salt Lake County to 
E. L. Hancock, dated December 31st, 1943 (P. Ex-
hibit 3) ; deed from Ernest L. Hancock and Marie W. 
Hancock, his wife, to A. D. Firmage, dated August 
30th, 1948 (P. Exhibit 2); quit-claim deed from A. D. 
Firmage and Hilda R. Firmage, his wife, to Falcon-
aero Enterprise, Inc., dated May 27th, 1950 (Exhibit 
1) ; warranty deed from Falconaero Enterprises, Inc., 
a corporation, to Charles W. Taggart, its. sole stock-
holder, dated June 29th, 1963 (Pre-trial Exhibit I), 
which was prior to the filing of the within action. 
4 
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The evidence showed that the Secretary of State 
of the State of Utah issued a certificate of dissolution 
to the said Falconaero Enterprises, Inc., August 13th, 
1 nn:~ (Pre-trial Exhibit 2), which also was prior to the 
comtnencement of the within action. 
The evidence showed the payment of taxes on the 
property herein concerned for the years 1955 to 1961, 
both inclusive (P. Exhibit 30); by stipulation (Tr. 
pages 67 to 69), the taxes for the years 1949 to 1954, 
both inclusive, became delinquent, and t~e property was 
redeetned from the preliminary treasurer's tax sales by 
Falconaero on March 31, 1954, and November 22, 1955, 
all amounts due by virtue of said sales having been fully 
paid, including interest, costs and penalties. 
The evidence showed the property in question 
consisted of about 20 acres and was part of approxi-
mately a thousand-acre tract claimed by Falconaero. 
On part of the property fronting on Redwood Road, 
about three-fourths of a mile to the east from the 
20-acre tract herein concerned, Falconaero operated a 
chuck wagon restaurant and some stables. To the south 
of the 20-acre tract, there was a lake to which some im-
provements had been made. The large tract, including 
the 20-acre piece herein concerned, was used for grazing 
horses, and the following revenues for such use were 
receh·ed during the years 1957 to 1961, respectively: 
$300.00, $210.00, $150.00, $400.00, and $246.00 (Tr. 
pages 5-!, 55, P. Exhibits 22 to 28 inclusive). The 20-
acre tract was used only for pasture (Tr. 59). 
5 
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The testimony of the two Firmages (father and 
son) and Mr. Bennett was to the effect that the larger 
tract, of which the 20 acres was a part, was surrounded 
by an electric barb wire fence (Tr. pages 30 to 40, 43, 
55, 56) because it was economical ( Tr. p. 43). The 
photos Plaintiff-Respondent submitted in evidence (P. 
Exhibits 7 to 21, both inclusive) showed a line of posts, 
irregularly spaced, with no fencing attached to any of 
the posts except as shown in three or four of said photos. 
In those photos which showed any wire attached to the 
posts, the wire ran into the ground in each direction 
from the posts to which it was attached. The inter-
mittent fencing and irregularly spaced posts were con-
firmed by evidence introduced by Defendant-Appellant 
(Tr. p. 74 to 85). Mr. Firmage admitted that they had 
not planted crops on this tract (Tr. p. 48). 
At the pretrial, Plaintiffs-Respondents admitted 
that the county auditor did not comply with the law re-
garding the affixing of affidavits to the assessment rolls 
for the years involved, regarding the 20-acre tract (Tr. 
p. 10). 
The evidence showed that Mr. Firmage and Fal-
conaero considered the property suitable for commercial, 
business and industrial purposes ( Tr. p. 48, and Pre-
trial Exhibit 2) , and that the property across the high-
way (21st South Street) to the north has been de-
veloped over the years as an industrial center, formerly 
called the Arms Plant; that the property to the west 
on 21st South, is lined on both sides with industrial and 
6 
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commercial enterprises (Tr. P. 49, 50). The large 
tract. including the 20-acre piece concerned herein, was 
sold recently for approximately $2,000.00 per acre 
(Tr. p. 58, 59). 
Over the objection of Defendant-Appellant, the 
eourt at the pre-trial permitted Plaintiff Falconaero to 
amend its complaint and add thereto the name of 
Charles ,V. Taggart as an additional party plaintiff 
('fr. p. 9). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF FALCON AERO ENTER-
PUlSES, INC., LACKED LEGAL CAPACITY 
TO FILE SUIT, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE ACTION. 
Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero alleged in para-
graph 1 of its Complaint its legal existence as a corpo-
ration (Tr. p. 2). As provided by Rule 9 (a) (I) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant-Appel-
lant raised the issue of legal capacity in its Amendment 
to its Answer ( Tr. p. 8) , and the documentary evidence 
introduced at the pre-trial showed Falconaero had con-
Yeyed all the assets of the corporation, including the 
property subject to suit, to Mr. Taggart, its sole stock-
holder, on June 29th, 1963 (Pre-trial Exhibit 1), and 
that pursuant to application of Falconaero, the certifi-
cate of dissolution was issued August 13th, 1963, more 
7 
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than a month prior to the filing of the within action 
(Pre-trial Exhibit 2). 
The effect of dissolution is stated in Model Business 
Corporation Act Annotated, Vol. 2, page 537, as fol-
lows: "Without a saving statute, actions by and against 
corporations which are dissolved or whose charters ex-
pire abate on dissolution." 
The termination of the corporate existence after 
dissolution is provided in Chapter 28, Section 88, Laws 
of Utah, 1961, as follows: 
" * * * Upon the issuance of such certificate of 
dissolution the existence of the corporation shall cease, 
except for the purpose of suits, other proceedings and 
appropriate action by shareholders, directors and offi-
cers as provided in this act.n (Italics ours.) 
There are two sections of the Utah Corporation 
Act which provide a "saving" clause. Section 100, 
Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1961, "saves" the corporation 
in relation to rights, claims and liabilities. In the case 
at bar, Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero had distrib-
uted its assets to Mr. Taggart, the sole stockholder, 
prior to this suit. Thus, Falconaero did not have any 
claim or right when suit was filed. While it is true it 
did grant by warranty deed, it cannot be said that it 
had created a liability to the grantee in so doing, as 
Mr. Taggart was entitled only to what the corporation 
had, and any warranty would not give rise to any lia-
bility upon the dissolved corporation. Thus, there being 
8 
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no clain1 or liability, Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero 
does not emne within the scope of said Section 100, and 
this ~ection cannot be the basis for continued corporate 
existence. 
The other saving statute, Section 101, Chapter 28, 
I ~aws of Utah 1961, provides as follows: 
"\Vinding Up Affairs. Notwithstanding the dis-
solution of a corporation ... , the corporate existence 
of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for the 
purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any 
property and assets which have not been distributed 
or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution~ and 
to effect such purpose such corporatoin may sell or 
otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and 
be sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental and 
necessary powers." (Italics ours.) 
In this case, the property was distributed to the 
sole stockholder of the corporation, prior to dissolution. 
The saYing effect of Section 101 is confined to property 
not distributed prior to dissolution. Thus, this Section 
cannot be used to prolong the corporate existence of 
Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero . 
... -\.t the time this action was filed, Taggart had 
any claim or property formerly held by Falconaero. 
F alconaero no longer had either, so there was no need 
to prolong the life of the dissolved corporation. If any 
cause of action existed regarding the property, it be-
longed to Taggart and he should have filed, not Falcon-
aero. 
9 
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Section 88 provides for the death of a corporation 
upon dissolution, and nothing in this case saves Plaintiff-
Repondent Falconaero from that death penalty. The 
court should have dismissed the action for want of a 
party plaintiff. 
POINT 2. 
PLAINTIFF FALCON AERO ENTER-
PRISE, INC., WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY 
IN INTEREST, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COM-
PLAINT. 
Although Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero alleged 
in paragraph 3 of its Complaint (Tr. p. 2) that it was 
the owner of the property in question, the evidence 
showed it had conveyed away the property to its sole 
stockholder in distributing the corporate assets, prior 
to the commencement of the within action. Thus, Fal-
conaero was not the real party in interest, as required 
by Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Wilson v. Kiesel, 9 U. 397, 35 P. 488, applying the 
Utah statute then in effect, which had the same provi-
sions found in Rule 17, held that if a party has parted 
from his interest in a judgment prior to suit, he is not 
the real party in interest in a new action brought on the 
prior judgment. 
In Glos v. Goodrich, 175 Ill. 20, 51 NE 643, the plain-
tiff sued to quiet title on some lots she had previously 
10 
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t·onvc)Td by warranty deed, some of the purchase money 
having been withheld by the grantee pending the clear-
ing of title. The court said: "One having no title to land 
cannot contest a cloud upon the title created by an 
incumbrance or an adverse title." 
The Indiana statutes required every action to be 
prosecuted by the real party in interest. In Chapman 
v . .f ones, IJ.H Ind. 434, 47 NE 1065, 49 NE 347, the 
plaintiff had conveyed the property by warranty deed 
prior to the commencement of the action. The court 
held the plaintiff had no interest left, and therefore, 
could not quiet title. The same result in a quiet title 
action was reached by the court in Jones v. Smith, 82 
\\'. \'"a. 24<7, 95 SE 847. 
In Gulley v. Christian, an Oklahoma case, 176 P2d 
81 ~, the plaintiff alleged the quiet title action was 
brought for the benefit of plaintiff's grantee. The court 
dismissed the action for the reason that the plaintiff 
was not the real party in interest. 
Therefore, in the case at bar, Plaintiff-Respondent 
Falconaero, having distributed the property involved 
to its sole stockholder prior to the filing of the within 
action, was not, and is not the real party in interest. 
The trial court erred in not dismissing the action. 
POINT 3. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMIT-
TIXG T.A.GGART TO BE JOINED AS A 
PARTY PL.A.INTIFF. 
11 
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There are two reasons why the lower court in the 
pre-trial erred in permitting Plaintiff-Respondent Tag-
gart to be joined as a party plaintiff. 
A. 
Where an action is brought by one not the real 
party in interest, it is error to permit the joining of 
the real party in interest. The situation in Skewes v. 
Dunn, 3 U. 186, 2 P. 64, was somewhat similar to the 
case at bar. William Skewes filed an action to collect 
a note. It developed that his wife was the real party in 
interest, and during the proceedings, Skewes filed an 
affidavit to this effect and moved the court to substitute 
her as the plaintiff. Our Supreme Court said: "The 
court below erred in substituting her as plaintiff, be-
cause at time of the commencement of the case in the 
justice's court, as it appears by the affidavit of William 
Skewes on the motion to substitute, that William was 
not the real party in interest in the action." 
B. 
Inasmuch as Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero had 
been dissolved and lacked legal capacity therefore to 
sue, there was nothing before the court to amend. 
The effect of the dissolution of Plaintiff-Respond-
ent Falconaero in incapacitating it to sue is fully argued 
in Point 1 above, and will not be restated here. There 
are numerous cases, however, that hold that where such 
lack of legal capacity exists in the plaintiff, a trial court 
12 
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rat111ot permit the joining or substitution of another 
party plaintiff during the course of the proceedings. 
In St. :\lark's ~I. E. Church v. Georgia Power Co., 
19 Ga. ;:\ pp. 633, 91 SE 1047, an action was originally 
brought in the name of a church which was not a legal 
person. The court held that the complaint could not 
be axnended by substituting a plaintiff suing for the 
use of the church, saying that the original action was 
a nullity. There was nothing to amend. 
Brooks v. Boston & N. Street R. Co., 211 Mass. 
'277. 97 NE 760, is another case in point. The statute 
involved provided that "the court may ... allow any 
other amendment in matter of form or ~ubstance in 
any process, pleading or proceeding which may enable 
the plaintiff to sustain the action for the cause for which 
it was intended to be brought." The court said: "This 
language (of the statute) in plain words indicates the 
existence of a real plaintiff as the original instigator 
of the action. It gives no countenance to the idea that 
something phantasmal and visionary may be given a 
body and a substance by the aid of subsequent events. 
It pre-supposes a plaintiff. Here there was no plaintiff . 
. . . The present decision does not impair in any degree 
that which has been said in these and many other cases 
as to the liberality with which amendments are allowed 
under our practice. It only holds that where, in the 
nature of things, no person can be plaintiff and the 
cause of action is in suspense, an action cannot be insti-
tuted. If no action can be instituted, there is nothing 
to amend." 
13 
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Rule 15 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for amendments, stating that "A party may 
amend his pleading ... "Applying the rule of the fore-
going case to the within case, there is no "party" before 
the court who "may amend his pleading." 
The same rule was applied by the court in Mexican 
Mill v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co., 4 Nev. 40, 97 
Am. Dec. 510. The court said that the very first step 
toward the commencement of a civil action is the filing 
of a complaint in which it is indispensable that there 
be shown a plaintiff and a defendant, without which 
the action is an absolute nullity. All subsequent pro-
ceedings under it are void. The defect could not be cured 
by supplying the names of the persons involved, since 
there was no action to amend. 
Thus, applying the foregoing cases, Plaintiff-Re-
spondent Falconaero, was non-existent at the com-
mencement of the within action. There was nothing 
before the court to amend, and the attempt to amend 
by adding Mr. Taggart as a party plaintiff was futile. 
The court erred in permitting such an amendment. 
POINT 4. 
THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A 
CLAIM AS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPEL-
LANT UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
PREDICATED, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED. 
14 
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Det'endant-1\ppellant's First Defense reads as 
follows: "The Complaint does not state a claim as 
against this Defendant upon which relief can be predi-
l'ntcd or granted." (Tr. p. 5). 
In paragraph 3 of the complaint there appears the 
following allegation: " ... ,but that said claimed in-
terest of said defendants is invalid and inferior to the 
right, title and interest of the plaintiff in and to said 
property; ... " ( Tr. pages 2 & 3) . (Italics ours) . The 
prayer of said complaint contains the following: " ... ; 
that any interest claimed by any defendant, either 
known or unknown, is invalid and is inferior to the right, 
title and interest of the plaintiff; ... " (Tr. p. 4). (Italics 
ours.) 
In 'Vorley v. Peterson, 80 U. 27, 41, 12 P 2d 579, 
at page 584, our Supreme Court said: "To allege, as it 
is, that the asserted claims of the defendants were merely 
'junior and inferior' to the title and interest, etc., of 
the plaintiffs, does not show that such asserted claims 
were adverse or hostile to or in conflict with the plain-
tiffs' alleged title or interest." 
Thus, in the case at bar, Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
in using the term "inferior" in the body and prayer of 
the complaint, admitted the defendants had a claim, 
e\·en though inferior to that of the plaintiffs. For this 
reason, the complaint failed to state a cause of action. 
The trial court should have dismissed it. 
15 
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POINT 5. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE 
IS NOT DEFEATED BY THE FOUR-YEAR 
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIMITATION 
STATUTES RELATING TO TAX TITLES. 
Under this Point, the first question arising is 
whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents are relying upon 
the four-year adverse possession and limitation statutes. 
While there is no allegation in the Complaint (Tr. 
pages 1 to 4) that Plaintiffs-Respondents claim under 
a tax title, there was discussion during the course of 
the trial and in the arguments to the lower court con-
cerning the application of the four-year statutes relating 
to tax titles. The pre-trial order refers to these statutes 
( Tr. p. 10), and the Memorandum Decision of the trial 
court (Tr. p. 12) states that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
a judgment by virtue of one of said statutes. 
Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact (Tr. p. 14) 
states, "That the Plaintiff, Falconaero Enterprise, Inc., 
by and through its predecessors in title, purchased the 
land subject of this action from Salt Lake County, 
obtaining a County Tax Deed thereto by reason of a 
prior tax sale; ... " But there is no reference in the 
Conclusions of Law that Plaintiffs are entitled to a 
decree by virtue of the said four-year statutes. In fact, 
nowhere in the Findings, Conclusions or Decree does 
any reference appear regarding these statutes. Con-
sequently, Defendant-Appellant urges this Court to 
16 
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hold that, if the Plaintiffs-Respondents had such a 
theory of' the case, they have abandoned the same. At 
least the Decree is unsubstantiated without a Conclusion 
applying these statutes. 
Should this Court hold, however, that the Plain-
tiffs-Respondents have not abandoned this theory of 
their ease, and that the Decree is supported by the Find-
ings and Conclusions, then we present the following 
nrguments and citations which conclusively show that 
they failed in their proof, and that the evidence does not 
support the Findings, Conclusions and Decree. 
Section 104-2-5.11, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1951, 
defines a "tax title" as follows: 
"The term tax title as used in Section 104-2-5.10 
and Section 80-10-68.10, and the related amended Sec-
tions 104-2-5, 104-2-7, and 104-2-12, means any title 
to real property, whether valid or not~ which has been 
derived through or is dependent upon any sale, con-
veyance or transfer of such property in the course of a 
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax 
ln·icd against such property whereby the property is 
rclic·ced from a tax lien.n (Italics ours) . 
Thus, it is necessary that Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
as the tax title claimants, produce evidence that· a tax 
was levied against the property, there was a tax sale for 
the non-payment of taxes, and, the redemption period 
haYing expired, that a final sale was made to the county. 
Then they must prove that the property was relieved 
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of the tax lien. This is the law whether one claims under 
a valid tax title~ or one that is invalid. 
The only evidence submitted by Plaintiffs-Re-
spondents were the Auditor's Deed dated February 
28th, 1939, to the County, executed pursuant to the 
provisions of Title 80, Chapter 10, Section 66, Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933 (Pre-trial Exhibit 4), and the 
deed from Salt Lake County to Mr. Hancock dated 
December 31st, 1943, executed by virtue of Title 80, 
Chapter 10, Section 68, Utah Code Annotated 1943 
(P. Exhibit 3). Defendant-Appellant contends that 
neither of these two deeds proves any one of the fore-
going requirements set forth above in the definition of 
tax title. 
Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, 
provided that the deed issued by the county auditor, 
when duly executed and delivered, would be prima facie 
evidence of the facts recited therein. But this is no longer 
the law. The 1939 session of our legislature amended 
the taxing procedures, including this section, by enact-
ing Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1939, which amendment 
became effective in September, 1939. The amendment, 
which became known as Section 80-10-68, provides a 
new form of tax deed, and subparagraph ( 5) therein 
states that this new tax deed should be prima facie evi-
dence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent 
to the premliminary sale. 
The Auditor's Deed in this case was issued Feb-
ruary 28th, 1939, under the old law, and several months 
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before the new act became effective. Thus, it is no longer 
prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein~ the old 
statute having been amended. Nor is it, under the new 
law, prima facie evidence of the regularity of all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale~ for it does 
not conform thereto. In fact, this deed is not prima 
facie evidence of anything at the present time. The case 
of .Anson v. Ellison, 104 U. 576, 140 P. 2d 653, explains 
this very clearly. 
Neither is the deed from the County to Mr. Han-
cock ( P. Exhibit 3) , executed by virtue of Section 
80-10-68, subparagraph ( 8), Utah Code Annotated 
1943, prima facie evidence of anything, for the statute 
does not so provide. This also is explained in the Anson 
v. Ellison case. In fact, this case goes so far as to hold 
that although the parties enter into a stipulation that 
a certificate of sale had been issued (under the law such 
certificate being prima facie evidence of all proceedings 
to and including the preliminary treasurer's tax sale) , 
such stipulation will not show a valid levy and assess-
ment of taxes. 
Thus, Plaintiffs-Respondents have not proved 
there was a tax levied upon the property, that the prop-
erty was sold for the non-payment of taxes, nor that 
the property was relieved from a tax lien, as required 
by the definition of tax title in the statute. Consequently, 
there is a total failure of proof. They have not proved 
a tax title, either valid or invalid. Having thusly failed, 
there is absolutely no basis upon which to apply the 
four-year adverse possession and limitation statutes in 
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behalf of the claimant of a tax title. The trial court 
should have upheld Defendant-Appellant's fee title, 
and was in error in refusing to do so. 
In view of the law as set forth in Kurz v. Blume, 
407 Ill. 383, 95 NE 2d 338, 25 ALR 2d 1258, at pages 
1263-64, regarding presumptions in quiet title cases, 
and which will be discussed fully in Point 6, which 
follows, the court is not justified in raising a presump-
tion, or assuming that Plaintiffs-Respondents had a 
tax title in order to satisfy the statute defining the same. 
POINT 6. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE 
IS NOT DEFEATED BY THE SEVEN-YEAR 
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIMITATION 
STATUTES. 
The Seven-year adverse possession statutes applic-
able to the case before the Court are Sections 78-12-5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 and 12, UCA 1953. Under them, an adverse 
claimant is required to pay the taxes over a seven-year 
period. Here, the only evidence of the payment of taxes 
prior to delinquency covers the years 1955 to 1961, 
inclusive ( P. Exhibit 30) . Thus, the evidence of physical 
occupancy by Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero must 
be limited to these years. It should be pointed out that 
much of the testimony is indefinite as to time, and fails 
to meet the test of the citation in the following para-
graph. 
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To establish adverse possession, the type of evi-
dt'HCe required is clearly stated in Kurz v. Blume, 407 
I II. aHa, 95 NE 338, 25 ALR 2d 1258, at pages 1263-
ti ~. as follows: " ' ... It must be ( 1) hostile or adverse; 
( ~) actual; ( 3) visible, notorious and exclusive; ( 4) 
eontinuous; and ( 5) under a claim of title inconsistent 
with that of the possessor of the record title.' In apply-
ing this formula for proof of adverse possession, we 
have held that it cannot be made out by inference or 
implicationJ but must be established by evidence that is 
dear, positive and unequivocat all presumptions being 
in favor of the true owner. Loverkamp v. Loverkamp, 
381 Ill. 467, 45 NE 2d 871; Yunkes v. Webb, 399 
Ill. ~2, 170 NE 709; Wilkinson v. Watt, 309 Ill. 607, 
141 NE 383." (Italics ours). 
Our statutes recognize these presumptions in favor 
of the holder of the fee title. By virtue of Section 78-
12-7, UC A 1953, Defendant-Appellant, in this case, 
having established the legal title to the property, is 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the 
time required by law, and the occupation of it by any 
other person is deemed to have been under and in sub-
ordination of J)efendant-Appellant's title, unless ad-
\·erse possession be established here by Plaintiffs-Re-
spondents under the four-year or the seven.:.year stat-
utes. 
Section 78-12-9, UCA 1953, sets out the require-
ments for adverse possession under a written instrument, 
substantially as follows: 
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( 1) Where it has been usually cultivated or im-
proved. 
( 2) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
inclosure. 
( 3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used 
for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the pur-
pose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for the ordinary 
use of the occupant. 
( 4) Where a known farm or single lot has been 
partly improved, the use or inclosure of part is deemed 
to extend to the whole. 
In applying the above requirements to the within 
case, it is readily seen that Plaintiffs-Respondents have 
not established adverse possession, and that any pos-
session they had is deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the fee title of Defendant-Appellant. 
Under paragraph ( 1) there was no evidence of 
cultivation. Mr. Firmage stated the property was used 
only for grazing ( Tr. p. 59) . Also, the lack of cultiva-
tion is evidenced by the wild grass shown in the photos 
(P. Exhibits 7 to 21, inclusive). As to improvements, 
the photos do not show any. In the testimony, there was 
some reference to ditches, but their location and the time 
of the supposed construction of them is neither positive 
nor clear. (Tr. p. 40). The claimed improvements to 
the lake were indefinite as to the nature and extent 
thereof ( Tr. pages 40 & 41 ) , and do not establish ad-
verse possession of the 20-acre tract with which we are 
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here concerned, and which lies some distance away. 
Thus, there is a total failure to support adverse pos-
session under said paragraph (I) of Section 78-12-9, 
UC1\ 1953. 
In attempting to comply with the requirements 
of a substantial inclosure as provided in paragraph ( 2) 
of said Section, Plaintiffs-Respondents presented volu-
minous testimony of barb wire electric fencing around 
the peri1neter of the 1000-acre tract, which fencing Mr. 
F'irmage said they used because it was economical (Tr. 
p. 43). However, the photos (P. Exhibits 7 to 21, in-
elusive) showed clearly, positively and unequivocally 
that it did not constitute a "substantial inclosure." Most 
of the intermittent and irregularly spaced posts shown 
in the photos had no wire attached, and the few that 
did have, showed the wire running into the ground. If 
anything, the photos constitute conclusive proof that 
there never had been a "substantial inclosure" around 
the property. 
In construing paragraph (3) of Section 78-12-9, 
UCA 1953, relating to the use of property "for pastur-
age or for the ordinary use of the occupant," the law 
is set out in 3 Am. J ur. 2d, pages 93 and 94, under the 
heading of "Adverse Possession," in the following 
terms: 
"The determination of what constitutes possession 
of property for purposes of adverse possession depends 
to a large extent upon the character of the premises. 
Thus, in determining what will amount to an actual 
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possession of land, considerable importance must be 
attached to its nature, character, and locality, and to 
the uses to which it can be applied, or to which the 
claimant may choose to apply it. Indeed, to constitute 
adverse possession the claimant must appropriate the 
land to some purpose to which it is adapted." 
Our own Court applied this same rule in the case 
of Day v. Steele, Ill U. 481, 184 P2d 216. 
Defendant-Appellant submits that the operation 
of a chuck wagon restaurant and stables over three-
quarters of a mile away from the property in this suit, 
fails to establish clearly~ positively or uneqivocally~ or 
otherwise, any use of the 20-acre tract with which we 
are here concerned. 
According to Mr. Firmage (Tr. p. 59), the only 
use made of the 20-acre tract was for pasturage, and 
its use was in connection with the remainder of the 1000 
acres. Mr. Firmage testified that the revenues for this 
use during the years 1957 to 1961 ranged from $150.00 
per year to approximately $400.00 per year (Tr. pages 
54, 55, P. Exhibits 22 to 28) -a tidy return on property 
worth about two million dollars! 
The officers of Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero 
thought the property was suited for business and indus-
trial purposes, which uses were described in the articles 
of incorporation. The property lies just south of 21st 
South Street, a state highway, which is lined on both 
sides with industrial and business enterprises. In all 
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the years Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero claimed it, 
not once did they use it for the business and industrial 
purposes planned and for which it is suitable. It finally 
sold for approximately two million dollars, and they 
used it only to pasture horses for a pittance! 
Thus, Plaintiffs-Respondents have failed miserably 
to establish by "clear, positive and unequivocal" evidence 
that the 20-acre tract has been used by them "to some 
purpose to which it is adapted," considering "its nature, 
elmracter, and locality." 
There was no evidence, nor did the court find, 
that the 20-acre tract was part of a "known farm," as 
specified in paragraph (4) of Section 78-12-9, UCA 
HL>3. Consequently, this paragraph gives no aid or 
comfort to Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
By way of summary of the foregoing, the law is 
clear that all presumptions are in favor of the record 
owner-here, Defendant-Appellant; that adverse pos-
session must be established by clear, positive and un-
equivocal evidence; if there is an inclosure, it must be 
substantial; and the land must be appropriated to some 
purpose to which it is adapted, considering its nature, 
character and locality. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents' evidence showed an inex-
pensive and flimsy inclosure, temporary ·in nature; the 
improvements were nil; and the use of the 1000-acre 
tract of which this is a small part, consisted of grazing 
horses for insignificant sums, on land which sold for 
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about two million dollars, and which the owners thought 
to be suitable for business and industrial purposes, and 
which is surrounded by business and industrial prop-
erties. 
There is but one conclusion: Defendant-Appellant 
has the fee title, and is presumed to be in the possession 
of the said property. Plaintiffs-Respondents absolutely 
failed to establish adverse possession under the statutes 
and citations set forth above. The trial court was in 
error in finding that it was established and in rendering 
a decree predicated thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the record that Plaintiff-Respond-
ent Falconaero lacked capacity to sue, and, in addition, 
was not the real party in interest. Therefore, for either 
one or both of these reasons, it had no standing in court. 
For either one or both of these same reasons, there was 
nothing before the court when Falconaero attempted 
to amend the Complaint by adding Mr. Taggart as a 
party Plaintiff. The trial court should have ended the 
matter forthwith by dismissing the Complaint. 
Further, when Falconaero stated in its Complaint 
that Defendant had an interest which was "inferior" 
to that of the Plaintiff, it admitted Defendant's interest. 
In so doing, it failed to state a cause of action for ad-
verse possession, and the trial court should have dis-
missed the Complaint. 
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From the record, it also is clear that Plaintiffs-
Hes pondents either abandoned any theory they might 
have had of adverse possession under the four-year 
statutes relating to tax titles, or that they failed in their 
attempt to prove one. 
Under the seven-year adverse possession and limi-
tation statutes, there also was a failure by Plaintiffs-
Hespondents to prove the statutory requirements. Con-
sequently, all presumptions being favorable to Defend-
ant-Appellant, the holder of the fee title, the trial court 
should have granted decree favorable to Defendant-
Appellant. 
Consequently, the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and decree are totally unsupported by the evidence 
and the Ia w, and the trial court should be reversed as 
a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William D. Callister 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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